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THE RULE OF LAW 
John V. Orth† 
HE IMPORTANCE OF THE RULE of law is universally acknowledged. 
It is regularly invoked by politicians and commentators, not just 
in America but around the world, even in countries not known 
for their devotion to civil rights. Hardly a day passes without 
mention of the rule of law in the news media. But rarely is the concept 
defined, and when an attempt is made to give it specific content, the defini-
tion is often contested as too limited or too broad. In the Anglo-American 
legal tradition, the rule of law developed over time, its roots usually traced 
to Magna Carta in 1215, when rebellious English barons, “sword in hand,” 
forced the king to promise to proceed only “per legem terrae,” according to 
the law of the land.1 Over the ensuing centuries, this promise was occa-
sionally lost sight of, but in repeated political and constitutional crises it 
was forcefully restated and elaborated. The modern struggle to establish 
the rule of law began in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in England 
and continued as thirteen of Britain’s American colonies demanded their 
independence. The struggle is not over yet, and probably never will be. 
The rule of law is not a purely legal concept but has broad cultural res-
onance. An early debate about its meaning, with eerie echoes in the highest 
political circles, can be heard in William Shakespeare’s bitter comedy 
                                                                                                                           
† John Orth is the William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina 
School of Law. 
1 The Federalist No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), at 534 (ed. Benjamin Fletcher Wright, 1966); 
Magna Carta c. 39 (1215); William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England I:123 
(1765-69) (“sword in hand”). 
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Measure for Measure, which premiered in 1604 with King James I in the au-
dience. Angelo, the deputy who ruled Vienna during the absence of its 
Duke, enforced the duchy’s harsh law against fornication, sentencing the 
concupiscent Claudio to death. In response to an impassioned plea by 
Claudio’s sister, Angelo denied personal responsibility: “It is the law, not I, 
condemns your brother.”2 When acting as a judge, Angelo explained, he 
was merely “the voice of the recorded law.”3 Twenty years later, Sir Ed-
ward Coke, once a royal judge, now an outspoken critic of royal absolut-
ism, rallied the House of Commons in defense of the writ of habeas corpus: 
“It is a maxim, The common law hath admeasured the King’s prerogative. . . . It 
is against law that men should be committed and no cause shown. . . . [I]t 
is not I, Edward Coke, that speaks it but the records that speak it.”4 Not 
the judge, but the law. 
This was not the first time that Coke had defended the common law 
against the King, often invoking a reinvigorated version of Magna Carta. 
Only a few years after the premiere of Measure for Measure, he had dared to 
instruct his monarch that “[c]auses which concern the life, or inheritance, or 
goods, or fortunes of his subjects, are not to be decided by natural reason 
but by the artificial reason and judgment of law, which law is an act which 
requires long study and experience, before that a man can attain cognizance 
of it. . . .”5 Speaking for the law and not for oneself does not come natu-
rally; it is a skill that must be learned. Furthermore, Coke declared – at 
the risk of being charged with treason – the King is not above the law but 
“sub Deo et lege,” under God and the law.6 No one is above the law. 
Law’s autonomy and universality are essential elements of the rule of 
law. Specific legal arrangements that implement and often accompany these 
elements vary with time and place, making a comprehensive statement of 
the requirements of the rule of law difficult, but these twin ideals are always 
                                                                                                                           
2 Measure for Measure 2.2.80. 
3 2.4.61-62. 
4 Quoted in Catherine Drinker Bowen, The Lion and the Throne: The Life and Times of Sir Edward 
Coke 484 (1956) (referring to Darnell’s Case, 3 How. St. Tr. 1 (K.B. 1627), popularly known 
as the Five Knights Case).  
5 Prohibitions del Roy, 12 Co. 63, 65, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1343 (1607). 
6 Id. (paraphrasing 2 Bracton, On the Laws and Customs of England 33 (Samuel E. Thorne trans. 
1968)). 
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at its core. Law is radically distinct from the personality of the judge, who 
decides cases by reference not to personal preference but to specific types 
of authority, using a distinctive style of legal reasoning. And law applies 
equally to all, high and low, the governors as well as the governed. 
When in 1776 British colonists in North America lost confidence in the 
royal judges and became convinced that King George III was acting as if he 
were above the law, they determined to renounce their allegiance and 
make real Tom Paine’s vision: “In America the law is king.”7 The obvious 
place to begin was with the independence of the judiciary. Prominent 
among the articles of indictment against King George in the Declaration of 
Independence was the charge: “He has made Judges dependent on his Will 
alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their 
salaries.”8 The new states promptly responded by writing into their consti-
tutions guarantees of judicial independence. The North Carolina Constitu-
tion of 1776, for example, granted the judges tenure “during good behav-
iour” – making them removable, not at will, but only for cause – and 
promised them “adequate salaries,” to prevent economic coercion.9 A 
dozen years later, the United States Constitution cast the guarantee in 
classic form: “The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall 
hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, re-
ceive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished 
during their Continuance in Office.”10 
Quickly it came to be seen that an independent judiciary would be best 
anchored in a separate department of government. The Massachusetts 
Constitution, adopted in 1780, recognized the connection between judicial 
independence and the supremacy of the law when it declared that the 
powers of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches must be separate 
“to the end that it may be a government of laws and not of men.”11 Chief 
Justice John Marshall invoked the same phrase to justify judicial review of 
congressional legislation in the landmark case of Marbury v. Madison in 1803: 
“The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a 
                                                                                                                           
7 Thomas Paine, Common Sense 98 (ed. Isaac Kramnick, 1976). 
8 The Declaration of Independence para. 12. 
9 N.C. Const. of 1776, §§ 13 & 21. 
10 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. 
11 Mass. Const., Decl. of Rts., art. XXX. 
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government of laws, and not of men.”12 The fundamental difficulty, of 
course, is that law is not a disembodied force that can rule a nation. As the 
practical statesmen who established the American government recognized, 
it would necessarily be a government “administered by men over men.”13 
The law must find its voice in the mouths of the judges. 
More than an independent judiciary is required if the law is truly to be 
king. Judgments must be enforced, even against the other branches of 
government. As the unillusioned James Madison explained: “Ambition 
must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be 
connected with the constitutional rights of the place.”14 Arrangements to 
diffuse power are built into the constitutional structure, the famous checks 
and balances that allow one branch of government to restrain another. 
Congress has the power to impeach and remove officers in the other 
branches. The President has the power to veto congressional legislation. 
The Supreme Court has the power to declare government actions unconsti-
tutional and void. While the executive and the legislative branches contend 
for power, the judiciary defends the law and the constitution. 
Power is diffused, not only among separate branches of government, 
but also between the state and federal governments. Bills of Rights at both 
levels offer safeguards against government over-reaching – some garnered 
from the English legal tradition, such as the writ of habeas corpus, earlier 
defended by Sir Edward Coke; others inspired by colonial experience with 
official harassment, such as the guarantee of proper procedure; still others 
added later to redress specific abuses, such as the equal protection clause 
adopted after the American Civil War. Particular attention is paid to law 
enforcement which is subject to restraints at every stage, from search and 
seizure through arrest, detention, prosecution, trial, and final punishment. 
Ex post facto laws, making acts criminal after the fact, are prohibited. Trial 
by jury, which had proved itself so potent a defense against tyranny both 
in England and in the colonies, is guaranteed. 
Abuses of criminal law were not the only objects of concern. Economic 
rights are also protected. States are prohibited from “impairing the obliga-
                                                                                                                           
12 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
13 The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison), at 356 (ed. Benjamin Fletcher Wright, 1966). 
14 Id. 
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tion of contracts.”15 The Fifth Amendment prohibits the taking of private 
property “for public use without just compensation.”16 And the guarantee 
of due process, the American expression of Magna Carta’s “law of the land,” 
developed in time extensive and unexpected applications as a defense of 
economic and privacy interests. 
Supplementing the constitutional guarantees are judicial practices famil-
iar from English common law, such as stare decisis, the doctrine of prece-
dent, “a foundation stone of the rule of law.”17 Another English tradition 
was the detailed judicial opinion, explaining a court’s decision. In Chief 
Justice John Marshall’s last reported case, he described his lifelong goal in 
opinion-writing: to convince the parties “that the case has been fully and 
fairly considered, that due attention has been given to the arguments of 
counsel, and that the best judgment of the court has been exercised on the 
case.”18 
A hundred years after American Independence, and long after America 
had settled on due process as its guarantee against arbitrary rule, influential 
English legal scholar A.V. Dicey popularized the phrase “the rule of law.”19 
Because England lacks a written constitution like the American one with 
textual restraints on the government, Dicey deployed the concept to mark 
the proper limits of government power. No one should be punished except 
for a violation of previously declared law. There should be a unified court 
system, with no special courts for public officers. And rights are not to be 
understood as conferred by the constitution but rather as the basis of it. 
Although the phrase is forever associated with Dicey, the rule of law has 
escaped his specific formulation and become a generic term to refer to a 
legal system that prevents arbitrariness, guarantees equal treatment, and – 
in many usages – enforces contracts and protects property. The demand 
for the rule of law in this sense is now a global phenomenon, not limited 
to countries sharing the common law tradition and sounded even in non-
Western societies. The President of China, for example, has called on 
judges to “lock power in a cage,” and the Chinese Communist Party has 
                                                                                                                           
15 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. 
16 U.S. Const. amend. V. 
17 Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2036 (2014). 
18 Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 715 (1835). 
19 A.V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution 179-99 (7th ed. 1908). 
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reaffirmed the constitution’s guarantee of judicial independence: “The 
people’s courts exercise judicial power independently, in accordance with 
the provisions of law, and not subject to interference by any administrative 
organ, public organization or individual.”20 
While due process has remained the familiar American expression of 
the rule of law, in the decades after Dicey his phrase occasionally appeared 
in United States Supreme Court opinions, including in important cases in 
which the court was forced to look beyond familiar constitutional texts. A 
generalized version of the rule of law was invoked in the Insular Cases, 
concerning the civil rights of residents in America’s newly acquired island 
possessions such as Hawaii and the Philippines. Because the specific consti-
tutional protections in the Bill of Rights did not extend to these unincor-
porated territories, the justices were forced to distinguish rights that are 
“fundamental in their nature,” such as fair trial, from those that are inci-
dental to the Anglo-American legal tradition, such as indictment by grand 
jury and trial by a jury of twelve.21 In 1904 the Supreme Court recognized 
that there are “certain great principles of government which have been 
made the basis of our governmental system, which we deem essential to 
the rule of law and the maintenance of individual freedom.”22 These are 
guaranteed even to people from a different legal tradition. 
The Insular Cases anticipated the later debate over the limitations that 
the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on the states. Did the Amendment’s 
guarantee of due process include the protections detailed in the Bill of 
Rights that are applicable to actions by the federal government? In other 
words, did the Fourteenth Amendment incorporate the Bill of Rights and 
apply it to the states? At first, the Court tried, as in the Insular Cases, to 
distinguish rights that are “of the very essence of a scheme of ordered lib-
erty” from those that are not fundamental.23 In the words of Justice Felix 
Frankfurter, “As judges charged with the delicate task of subjecting the 
government of a continent to the Rule of Law we must be particularly 
mindful that it is ‘a constitution we are expounding,’ so that it should not 
be imprisoned in what are merely legal forms even though they have the 
                                                                                                                           
20 Economist (16 Aug. 2014) p. 35; P.R.C. Const. art. 126. 
21 Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 217 (1903). 
22 Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 122 (1904). 
23 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
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sanction of the Eighteenth Century.”24 But in the end, the familiar forms 
asserted themselves and one-by-one were incorporated in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, until today most of the Bill of Rights is applicable to the 
states as essential components of due process. 
Difficulty in giving content to the rule of law has led to widely varying 
assessments of its value. On the one hand, the English historian E.P. 
Thompson hailed it as “an unqualified human good,” a defense against 
“power’s all-intrusive claims.”25 On the other, Yale law professor Grant 
Gilmore remembered the phrase as used in America during the Cold War 
as one of several “cheerfully meaningless slogans.”26 Recently, promoting 
the rule of law has become a global industry with international aid agencies 
touting rule-of-law programs as “a way to reduce poverty, secure human 
rights, and prevent conflict.”27 But critics have complained that the pro-
grams ignore local conditions and overstate what can be achieved. 
The rule of law begins with rule by law, itself a not inconsiderable bene-
fit. A rule-based society is certainly preferable to a lawless one. Sir William 
Blackstone spoke for many when he described anarchy as “a worse state 
than tyranny itself, as any government is better than none at all.”28 Fidelity 
to properly adopted and widely known rules protects citizens from arbi-
trary decision-making; it is also economically efficient. At the very begin-
ning of the Industrial Revolution, Lord Mansfield recognized that “[i]n all 
mercantile transactions, the great object should be certainty and therefore, 
it is of more consequence that a rule should be certain, than whether the 
rule is established one way or the other.”29 Without the security provided 
by an independent judiciary enforcing contracts and protecting property, 
investors are less likely to risk their capital, which explains why authori-
tarian rulers of developing countries often lay claim to this limited version 
of the rule of law. 
 
                                                                                                                           
24 Adamson v. People of State of California, 332 U.S. 46, 66 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(internal quotation from McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819)). 
25 E.P. Thompson, Whigs & Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act 266 (1975). 
26 Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 106 (1977).  
27 G. John Ikenberry, Recent Books, Foreign Affairs vol. 93: no. 6 (Nov./Dec. 2014), p. 185. 
28 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England I:123. 
29 Vallejo v. Wheeler, 1 Cowp. 143, 153, 98 Eng. Rep. 1012, 1017 (K.B. 1774). 
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But the rule of law is meant to be more than merely utilitarian – a safe-
guard for the rights of free people, not only for the operations of the free 
market. By codifying and reinforcing unequal power relationships, particu-
lar laws may themselves violate the ideal which the rule of law expresses. 
It is cautionary to reflect that the rule of law co-existed for centuries with 
the institution of slavery. In what today seems a perversion, Chief Justice 
Roger Taney even held in the Dred Scott case that due process protected a 
slave owner’s property rights.30 To advance beyond rule by law to the rule 
of law, as Professor Harold Berman pointed out, “justice-based-on-law” 
must give way to “law-based-on-justice, with mercy playing an important 
role in exceptional cases.”31 For this reason, many commentators insist that 
to realize the ideal of the rule of law it must be accompanied by robust 
respect for individual rights and fair political processes. 
Where the rule of law allows for effective enforcement, as with the 
American guarantee of due process, it can protect the individual from op-
pression by the majority. The American Revolution may have deposed the 
king in favor of the law, but the law that should have restrained the king 
now restrains the sovereign people, who occasionally chafe at its restraints 
just as monarchs once did. More subtly, long-continued experience with 
the rule of law fosters a legal mentality in both the governors and the gov-
erned, causing grievances to be expressed in legal terms and channeling 
both action and reaction into legal forms. 
But even nations long committed to the rule of law admit exceptions 
to the ideal. During times of war or national emergency the normal pro-
tections of law are often abandoned. Internment, detention without trial, 
denial of legal representation, wiretapping, rule by decree – all appear in 
times of duress in the best regulated states. Although the Constitution ex-
pressly guarantees “the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus,” it also 
concedes that the writ can be suspended “when in Cases of Rebellion or 
Invasion the public Safety may require it.”32 Inter arma silent leges (When 
arms speak, the laws are silent) is a maxim as old as the Romans.33 
 
                                                                                                                           
30 Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 450 (1857). 
31 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition 530 (1983).  
32 U.S. Const. art. I, § 9. 
33 Cf. Cicero, pro Milone 4.11-12. 
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Law’s universality, the claim that law applies equally to all, high and 
low – regularly repeated ever since Magna Carta – is also never fully real-
ized. States can close their courts to suits against themselves by asserting 
the extra-constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity. In a famous dictum 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes implicitly recognized that the doctrine  
is at odds with the rule of law: “A sovereign is exempt from suit, not  
because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical 
and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority 
that makes the law on which the right depends.”34 Without a remedy there 
is no right.  
The rule of law is often equated with formal legal equality. In his cele-
brated dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, the case that upheld racial segregation, 
Justice John Marshall Harlan I argued that “[o]ur constitution is color-
blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of 
civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.”35 But equal laws applied 
to an unequal society inevitably produce unequal results. “The rich as well 
as the poor are forbidden to sleep under the bridges of Paris,”36 but no one 
who could afford an alternative would choose to billet there. Not only can 
undeviating adherence to equality under the law prevent unequal laws that 
promote substantive equality, but the procedural demands of due process 
also offer decided advantages to the wealthy, the educated, and the well-
counseled, who can be sure to secure all the protections afforded by law. 
Today, specialized bodies of law have developed to protect various 
classes perceived to be at a disadvantage in the marketplace: tenants against 
landlords, consumers against producers, employees against employers. 
Groups victimized by past (and present) discrimination may benefit from 
affirmative action programs, giving them preferential treatment. Yet, un-
equal laws intended to rectify social inequality have been challenged as vio-
lations of the rule of law. Indeed, the conservative economist F.A. Hayek 
roundly declared that “formal equality before the law is in conflict, and in 
fact incompatible, with any activity of the government deliberately aiming 
at material or substantive equality of different people, and . . . any policy  
 
                                                                                                                           
34 Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). 
35 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
36 Anatole France, Le Lys Rouge c. 7 (1894). 
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aiming directly at a substantive ideal of distributive justice must lead to the 
destruction of the Rule of Law.”37 
Law’s autonomy, ideally protecting individuals from arbitrary decisions, 
may also lead to unacceptable rigidity. All societies committed to the rule 
of law have struggled to provide some latitude for discretion. The historic 
court of equity offered substantial justice when the remedy at law was in-
adequate. But judges exercising equitable jurisdiction have long insisted 
that their discretion is not unbounded. As one of the English founders of 
modern equity put it, echoing Sir Edward Coke’s praise of the law’s artifi-
cial reason: “if conscience be not dispensed by the rules of science, it were 
better for the subject there were no Chancery at all than that men’s estates 
should depend upon the pleasure of a Court which took upon itself to be 
purely arbitrary.”38 As long ago remarked, the measure of justice in the 
court of equity should not, like the length of the Chancellor’s foot, vary 
from judge to judge.39 
Discretion in limited circumstances has been admitted even in law en-
forcement. The prosecutor has discretion whether to file charges or not. 
The jury has the power to nullify a statute in individual cases by refusing to 
convict. And the executive may pardon a convicted criminal or commute 
a convict’s sentence. Indeed, the dramatic dilemma in Shakespeare’s Measure 
for Measure is finally resolved by the Duke’s pardon of all the law-breakers, 
while leaving the law unaltered. Even civil disobedience finds support in 
the rule of law. Although the law necessarily speaks through the judges, not 
everything that comes out of their mouths is law. The law is king, supreme 
over all its subjects, and protesters appeal directly to the throne. 
Although due process has been given substantial content by two centu-
ries of judicial decisions, it is ultimately no more readily defined than the 
rule of law. As explained by Justice John Marshall Harlan II: “Due process 
has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by 
reference to any code. . . . It is a rational continuum which, broadly 
speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and 
                                                                                                                           
37 F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom 87-88 (1944). 
38 Sir Heneage Finch, Lord Nottingham, Ch. 1675-82, quoted in Biographical Dictionary of the 
Common Law 176 (ed. A.W.B. Simpson, 1984). 
39 John Selden, Table Talk (1689), quoted in Sources of English Legal and Constitutional History 
223-224 (eds. M.B. Evans & R.I. Jack, 1984). 
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purposeless restraints. . . .”40 Any final definition of due process, as of the 
rule of law, risks confining it in such a way as to prevent its use in future 
emergencies. 
If it is to endure, the rule of law must strike deep roots in the society at 
large. The public must develop a legal consciousness, not with the detail 
of a professional jurist, but with at least a general understanding and ac-
ceptance of the role assigned to the judiciary. Of course, respect for the 
law does not guarantee perfect adherence to its norms. Like all ideologies, 
it can tolerate individual lapses, sometimes even serious and prolonged 
lapses. But repeated and widespread failure can lead to the cynicism that 
causes its ultimate collapse. The rule of law can exist only if supported by 
a deep social consensus that respects proper procedure, that values equal 
treatment and fundamental fairness, and that fears the corrupting influ-
ence of power unrestrained by law. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
40 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
